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Given the changing landscape of Division I athletic competition, determining 
the most advantageous commitment to athletic programs is an important issue in 
sport and university policy. With the recent autonomy granted to select Division 
I Football Bowl Subdivision conferences and pending antitrust litigation vying 
for college athlete compensation, many universities are considering alternative 
courses of action in reducing their existing commitment to Division I athletics. 
Accordingly, this study sought to examine the impact of de-escalating Division I 
commitment—specifically discontinuing a Division I football program—on the 
status and reputation of the university and athletic department. In considering 
the entire population of universities which have discontinued their Division I 
football program from 1981 to 2010 (N = 21), the results revealed that football 
program discontinuation had little positive or negative impact on academic status 
and reputation, and a slight negative impact on athletic status. The implications of 
this research contributes important information on assessing previous decisions 
to discontinue a Division I football program and what became of those decisions.
Keywords: de-escalation of commitment, status, reputation, intercollegiate athlet-
ics, NCAA, Division I athletics, athletic administration, college football
Within the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the Division 
I classification is experiencing changes to its traditional operating model, most 
Corrected June 29, 2017—see last page.
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notably in allowing schools to provide more benefits to college athletes. For 
instance, the NCAA recently granted the top five Division I Football Bowl Sub-
division (FBS) conferences (hereafter “Power 5”)1 the freedom to offer additional 
privileges including cost of attendance stipends for college athletes, less restrictive 
recruiting policies, and increased staff sizes (Tracy, 2014). Further, pending antitrust 
litigation may allow Division I football (FBS only) and men’s basketball athletes 
the opportunity for additional compensation beyond athletic scholarships for use 
of their name, image, or likeness (Berkowitz, 2014). Depending on court rulings, 
there is the eventual possibility for an open market that would allow universities to 
compete for a student’s athletic abilities by offering a variety of copious benefits 
that include cash payments (Eder, 2014). Consequently, some believe that more 
Division I universities—notably those in non-Power 5 conferences—will reduce 
their commitment to athletics in similar fashion to the University of Alabama-
Birmingham’s (UAB) initial—but not final—decision to discontinue its FBS football 
program (Berkowitz, 2015; Infante, 2014).2
Amid the heightened challenges ahead for non-Power 5 universities, continuing 
to sponsor Division I athletics—specifically a Division I football program—may 
still provide financial or economic benefit to universities (Rascher & Schwarz, 
2015). Yet an increasing number of universities believe their existing Division I 
commitment to be a failing course of action, with some already having decided to 
de-escalate commitment (Hutchinson & Bouchet, 2014b). Historically, this reduced 
commitment to Division I athletics has primarily manifested in discontinuing the 
football program, reclassifying to a lower NCAA division, or discontinuing the 
athletic department altogether. While the economic rationale for these decisions 
is debatable, Division I has seen an increase in the number of universities by 75 
since the landmark decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma, et al. (1984),3 with a jump in FBS football programs from 105 to 127 
in 2014–2015. It is an interesting dynamic whereby universities consider de-
escalating their Division I commitment, yet continue to invest more and more in 
Division I athletics. An important component of the decision process ought to be 
the impact of de-escalation on both the status and reputation of the university and 
athletic department. While a substantial body of research has examined the impact 
of maintaining or increasing commitment to Division I athletics, limited research 
has considered the impact of decreasing commitment to Division I athletics and the 
university (Jones, 2014). Since the NCAA split Division I into three subdivisions 
in 1978, only a handful of Division I universities have reduced their commitment 
to athletics. Of the universities having decreased their commitment to Division I 
athletics, the vast majority opted to do so by discontinuing their football program 
(Hutchinson & Bouchet, 2014b). Therefore, using escalation of commitment theory 
as a framework, the purpose of this study was to examine the impact of discontinu-
ing a Division I football program on the status and reputation of the university and 
athletic department.
De-Escalation of Commitment
Escalation of commitment theory describes individuals and organizations that main-
tain and often increase commitment to a venture or course of action amid prolonged 
evidence of ambiguous or negative outcomes (Staw, 1981). Escalation research has 
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predominantly examined circumstances in which substantial resources were invested 
in a course of action that did not produce the desired outcome—frequently intended 
to generate a financial or economic return.4 Over time, this behavior becomes a true 
escalation of commitment in the decision to repeatedly persist in a course of action 
given the presence of ambiguous or negative outcomes. While the logical solution 
to an escalation scenario would be commitment reduction, researchers have long 
identified the interplay of four determinants—project, psychological, social, and 
structural—influencing persistence in a failing course of action (Staw & Ross, 1987). 
Given extensive investigation of escalation behavior, less research has empirically 
examined both theoretical and practical applications of de-escalation of commitment 
(Mähring, Keil, Mathiassen, & Pries-Heje, 2008). Although initially acknowledged as 
withdrawal or abandonment from a failing course of action (see Staw & Ross, 1987), 
de-escalation behavior also manifests in a reduction of commitment by considering 
alternative courses of action (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Therefore, de-escalation of 
commitment can be defined as the process of breaking an escalation cycle by reduc-
ing or redirecting the original failing course of action. To date, research has almost 
exclusively focused on the factors and processes for de-escalation in a variety of 
field-based qualitative case studies (see Hutchinson, 2013; Hutchinson & Bouchet, 
2014a, 2014b; Keil & Montealegre, 2000; Keil & Robey, 1999; Mähring et al., 2008; 
Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Yet, limited research has investigated the subsequent 
impact of de-escalation decisions on the performance of an organization.
De-Escalation in Division I Athletics
Within sport, the context of Division I athletics has served as the exclusive setting 
for investigating de-escalation behavior. Studies of athletics-based de-escalation 
have examined universities that recognized their commitment to Division I as a 
failing course of action. The overwhelming majority of universities acknowledged 
athletics as a failing course of action due to the financial expense not providing 
a comparable financial return, economic benefit, or otherwise spillover effect 
(e.g., increased enrollment). Consequently, select universities have reduced or 
redirected the extent of commitment to athletics participation (see Hutchinson 
& Bouchet, 2014b).5 As an example, Hutchinson (2013) operationalized Divi-
sion I athletic de-escalation of commitment in three capacities: (a) discontinu-
ing a Division I football program, (b) reclassifying from Division I to a lower 
division (e.g., Division II, III) or athletic association (e.g., National Association 
of Intercollegiate Athletics [NAIA]), and (c) restructuring a Division I athletic 
department (for an example, see Vanderbilt University [Pope, 2008]). While 
university decisions to de-escalate athletic programs are determined following 
extensive research, the actual impact on the university and athletic department 
has yet to be comprehensively examined.
Researchers have extensively studied the impact of Division I athletics on 
universities, primarily focusing on football (chiefly FBS and Football Champion-
ship Subdivision [FCS] levels of competition) and men’s basketball. Generally 
speaking, these studies have investigated the various impacts of maintaining or 
increasing commitment to Division I athletics including marketing and brand 
exposure effects, positive and negative financial and economic effects, admission 
applications and quality of students admitted effects, and status or prestige effects 
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Table 1 Impact of Division I Athletics
Topic References Application
Division I  
Athletics
Beyer and Hannah (2000) These publications provide 
scholarly research of the 
marketing/branding effects 
(specifically university brand 
exposure) gained from compe-
tition in Division I athletics.
Clotfelter (2011)
Frank (2004)
Goff (2000, 2004)
Roy, Graeff, and Harmon (2008)
Shulman and Bowen (2001)
Sperber (2000)
Tucker (2005)
Zimbalist (1999)
Baade and Sundberg (1996) These publications provide a 
diverse sample (although not 
exhaustive list) of scholarly 
research on the positive and 
negative financial and eco-
nomic effects of competition 
in Division I athletics.
Borland, Goff, and Pulsinelli 
(1992)
Daughtrey and Stotlar (2000)
Frank (2004)
Frieder and Fulks (2007)
Grimes and Chressanthis (1994)
Howell and Rascher (2011)
Hughes and Shank (2008)
Humphreys and Mondello (2007)
Koo and Dittmore (2014)
Meer and Rosen (2009)
Orszag and Israel (2009)
Orszag and Orszag (2005a, 2005b)
Rascher and Schwarz (2015)
Rhoads and Gerking (2000)
Schwarz (2011)
Skousen and Condie (1988)
Stinson and Howard (2007)
Tucker (2004)
Turner, Meserve, and Bowen 
(2001)
(continued)
(for a more comprehensive list of references, see Table 1). However, limited research 
has considered the actual positive and negative consequences to the university of 
de-escalating commitment to Division I athletics. With recent research indicating 
the importance of status and reputation attainment in increasing commitment to 
Division I athletics (Hutchinson, Nite, & Bouchet, 2015), it is imperative to under-
stand the impact of de-escalating athletic commitment on the status and reputation 
of the university and athletic department.
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Table 1 (continued)
Topic References Application
Division I 
Athletics
Chressanthis and Grimes (1993) These publications provide 
scholarly research concerning 
the impact (or lack of impact) 
of Division I athletics on 
university admission applica-
tions, enrollment, and the 
quality of students admitted to 
a university.
Chung (2013)
Frank (2004)
Goff (2000)
Jones (2009)
Lieber (2004)
McEvoy (2005, 2006)
Mixon and Hsing (1994)
Mixon and Ressler (1995)
Murphy and Trandel (1994)
Noll (2004)
Pope and Pope (2009, 2014)
Toma and Cross (1998)
Tucker and Amato (2006)
Beyer and Hannah (2000) These publications provide 
scholarly research concerning 
the role and/or impact (or lack 
of impact) of status or prestige 
in competing in Division I 
athletics.
Bouchet and Hutchinson (2010)
Bouchet, Laird, Troilo, Hutchin-
son, and Ferris (in press)
Dwyer, Eddy, Havard, and Braa 
(2010)
Goidel and Hamilton (2006)
Goff (2000)
Hutchinson, Nite, and Bouchet 
(2015)
Kelly and Dixon (2011)
Simon (2008)
Within studies of organizations, there has been a “renewed interest in under-
standing the impact of status and reputation on organizational outcomes” (Patterson, 
Cavazos, & Washington, 2014, p. 74). According to Washington and Zajac (2005), 
status is a sociological concept that considers “differences in social rank that gen-
erate privilege or discrimination” while reputation is an economic concept that 
captures “differences in perceived or actual quality or merit that generate earned, 
performance-based rewards” (p. 283). At the time of this study, only two investiga-
tions had considered in part the measurable impact of decreasing commitment to 
Division I athletics. First, Goff (2000) used regression analysis to estimate enroll-
ment changes at the University of Texas at Arlington (discontinued FBS program 
in 1986) and Wichita State University (discontinued FBS program in 1987). The 
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findings indicated that university enrollment decreased roughly 600 students when 
compared with years in which football was sponsored. Second, Jones (2014) used 
difference-in-differences estimation to examine the impact of discontinuing football 
on freshmen application trends at East Tennessee State University, Saint Mary’s 
College of California, and Siena College (each of which discontinued their FCS 
program in 2004). In comparing these three universities to peer universities that 
maintained their FCS program, Jones found that football discontinuation was largely 
uncorrelated with reductions in freshmen admission applications.
While these studies provide a starting point for better understanding the impact 
of de-escalating commitment to Division I athletics, they are limited in two principal 
capacities. First, both provide a very small sample size (N = 2 [Goff, 2000]; N = 3 
[Jones, 2014]) when considering the total population of universities available for 
examination. This substantially limits the generalizability of the findings. Second, 
these studies investigated only two variables of impact regarding academic status: 
enrollment and freshmen application trends. Neither study considered other status 
and reputation variables that may impact the university and athletic department. 
Therefore, this study focused on several status- and reputation-related variables 
in examining the entire population of universities having discontinued their Divi-
sion I football program following the NCAA’s establishment of three Division I 
subdivisions in 1978.
Status and Reputation Variables
Research has identified several variables that measure status and reputation in the 
university and athletic department setting (see Bouchet, Laird, Troilo, Hutchinson, 
& Ferris, in press; Washington & Zajac, 2005). For this study, we followed the 
approach of Bouchet et al. (in press) in collecting data from several variables to 
provide a comprehensive representation of the impact of de-escalation on status 
and reputation. In conjunction with their associated construct, data collected 
were as follows: academic status variables included Carnegie Classification and 
U.S. News & World Report Ranking; academic reputation variables included the 
number of university applicants, ACT/SAT scores sent to universities, and aver-
age freshman ACT/SAT scores; athletic status variables included Sagarin ratings 
(men’s basketball) and Associated Press poll rankings (men’s basketball, women’s 
basketball); and the athletic reputation variable included Director’s Cup rankings. 
Further, additional control variables were collected that included geographic (state) 
location, state population, state population growth, state gross domestic product, 
university enrollment, and university endowment.
Amid these efforts for a comprehensive examination, only four variables 
had a sufficient number of observations (i.e., available data) to conduct statistical 
analyses. These included a single measure of athletic success and three measures 
of academic success. Athletic status was measured using Sagarin Ratings for men’s 
basketball (Source: USA Today Sagarin Ratings). Computed by Jeff Sagarin, the 
Sagarin Ratings is a method for rating and ranking a variety of professional and 
amateur sport teams. For purposes of this study, we used the Sagarin Ratings for 
all NCAA Division I men’s basketball teams. Using a synthesis of three different 
methods, Sagarin Ratings provide an overall ranking where high performing teams 
produce a lower number (e.g., ranking of 16) and low performing teams produce 
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a higher number (e.g., ranking of 236). Thus, the lower the ranking, the better 
the team. The Sagarin Men’s Basketball Rating was included as a result of some 
universities desiring to reinvest excess funds recouped from discontinuing football 
in other sport team offerings, often men’s basketball (Hutchinson, 2013; Jaschik, 
2009; Sperber, 2009; Watts, 2015).
Academic reputation, quality of incoming students, and demand was mea-
sured using U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) Rankings6 (Source: USNWR), 
incoming average SAT scores (Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System [IPEDS] Data Center, Institutional common data sets), and university 
enrollment (Source: IPEDS Data Center, Institutional common data sets). Not-
withstanding the criticisms of academic ranking systems, the USNWR’s annual 
ranking of academic quality is widely circulated and impacts decision making by 
entering baccalaureate students (Morse, 2011). Universities have also stated that 
one reason for discontinuing football was to be able to reallocate resources toward 
academic improvement (see Hutchinson, 2013; Jaschik, 2009; Sperber, 2009). A 
better ranking by USNWR is consistent with this idea. Concurrent with the stated 
goal of higher academic reputation is attracting more and better students. Thus, 
analyses of incoming average SAT scores were undertaken as well as analyses of 
the enrollment figures for incoming freshmen.
Accordingly, the limited availability of data and relative dearth of research on 
this topic led to the following four research questions that guided this exploratory 
study:
RQ1: Did the men’s basketball program improve after discontinuing football?
RQ2: Did U.S. News & World Report’s Colleges and Universities ranking improve 
after discontinuing football?
RQ3: Did SAT scores for incoming freshmen improve after discontinuing football?
RQ4: Did the university increase enrollments after discontinuing football?
Method
While Bouchet et al. (in press) investigated universities increasing commitment to 
Division I ahtletics, this study examined the impact of discontinuing a Division I 
football program on the status and reputation of the university and athletic depart-
ment. Originally, de-escalation behavior was operationalized in three capacities: (a) 
discontinuing a Division I football program, (b) reclassifying from Division I to a 
lower division (e.g., Division II, Division III) or athletic association (e.g., NAIA), 
and (c) discontinuing a Division I athletic department altogether. Upon data col-
lection conclusion, discontinuing a Division I football program was the only event 
to provide sufficient data to measure the pre- and post-impact of such a decision.7 
As a result, the population of all Division I universities having discontinued their 
FBS or FCS football program (N = 21) from 1981 to 2010 were included in the 
current study (see Table 2). Following the NCAA’s decision to offer three Division 
I subdivisions in 1978, the year 1981 was selected due to the multiyear grace period 
for universities’ optional transition between classifications throughout 1979 and 
1980; therefore, data were not collected for these years.
In similar fashion to Bouchet et al. (in press), each of the four outcome vari-
ables was compared pre- and post-decision to discontinue football. Specifically, the 
80  Hutchinson, Rascher, and Jennings
JIS Vol. 9, No. 1, 2016
average USNWR ranking for the five years before discontinuing football and the 
five years after discontinuing football (with the year of discontinuation excluded) 
were compared. This aided in smoothing out any perturbation from a single year 
and allowed time for the changes to take place. The sufficiency of using five years 
before and after the change in status is shown by analyzing the coefficient of varia-
tion (CV) in the data during each of the subperiods to see if the data show low 
variability to be representative. The resulting CV calculations show an average 
CV of less than 0.2 across the outcome variables. While there is not a critical level 
for CV, researchers note that a CV of 1 is quite high, showing a lot of variability, 
and a CV of 0.1 or 0.2 is very low and generally sufficient (Dunn & Clark, 2009; 
Kalton, 1983).
An average of the five years before the decision was compared with the aver-
age of the five years after the decision across the outcome variables. This was done 
systematically in a single estimation method across all of the universities in the 
sample. The comparison method was an unpaired t test of the differences in means 
over the two time periods.8 A more comprehensive analysis that included control 
Table 2 Division I Universities Discontinuing Football (1981–2010)
Institution Football Classification First Year Without Football
University of Texas at Arlington FBS 1986–1987
Southeastern Louisiana University FCS 1986–1987
Wichita State University FBS 1987–1988
Lamar University FBS 1990–1991
California State University, Long 
Beach
FBS 1992–1993
California State University, Fullerton FBS 1993–1994
University of the Pacific FBS 1996–1997
Boston University FCS 1998–1999
University of Evansville FCS 1998–1999
California State University, Northridge FCS 2002–2003
Canisius College FCS 2003–2004
Fairfield University FCS 2003–2004
St. John’s University FCS 2003–2004
East Tennessee State University FCS 2004–2005
Siena College FCS 2004–2005
St. Mary’s College of California FCS 2004–2005
St. Peter’s University FCS 2007–2008
La Salle University FCS 2008–2009
Iona College FCS 2009–2010
Northeastern University FCS 2010–2011
Hofstra University FCS 2010–2011
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variables like marketing expenditures (i.e., if a school spends more on marketing 
it might receive a larger pool of candidates from which to choose, thus enrolling a 
higher quality incoming class) was not possible given there were only 21 observa-
tions. In other words, the population size was too small to conduct anything more 
than a straightforward comparison of means. Importantly, given that this is the 
total population of universities discontinuing Division I football since 1978, it is 
a comprehensive methodology and provides insight into the impact of the action.
Results
In answering RQ1, all schools on the list averaged being ranked 148 (median of 
135) in the Sagarin Men’s Basketball Rankings during the five years before dis-
continuing football (M = 148, SD = 53). After discontinuing football, those same 
schools averaged being ranked 176 (M = 176, SD = 56), with a median of 183. 
The pre- and post-rankings are statistically significantly different from each other 
(t(38) = -1.6119, p = .0576), and show that the men’s basketball programs did not 
benefit, and actually suffered, from football being discontinued.
For RQ2, the sample size was less (n = 11) due to earlier football discontinua-
tion dates in the 1980s not corresponding with USNWR actually putting out rank-
ings, or those schools were not ranked by USNWR. The average predrop rankings 
were 66 (M = 66, SD = 53), with the postdrop rankings being 70 (M = 70, SD = 55). 
The medians were 60 and 63, respectively. These are not statistically significantly 
different from each other (t(22) = -0.1922, p = .4247). Thus, the schools did not 
improve their academic ranking after discontinuing football.
In addressing RQ3, the available sample of universities (n = 15) experienced an 
average SAT score increase from 1,078–1,105 (M = 1,078, SD = 110; M = 1,105, 
SD = 146), with the median increasing from 1,095–1,104. This is not statistically 
significant (t(27) = -0.8724, p = .1953), implying that there was no change in SAT 
scores during the five years before dropping football compared with the five years 
afterward. It is important to note that the average SAT score for all reporting uni-
versities grew from 994 in 1980–1,028 in 2005.9
For RQ4, the available sample of universities (n = 18) reported enrollments 
for the years preceding and after discontinuing football. Those enrollments aver-
aged 15,728 (M = 15,278, SD = 12,283) before discontinuing football and 16,081 
(M = 16,081, SD = 12,453) afterward, a growth of 2.2% over those time periods 
(medians were 9,993 and 10,233). The difference is not statistically significant 
(t(35) = -0.0597, p = .4764), thus discontinuing football did not correspond with 
any increases in enrollments. Importantly, during five-year increments from 1985 
through 2000, average enrollment grew by 6.2%, meaning that on average, the 
schools that discontinued football grew more slowly than the average school across 
the United States.
Discussion
The findings from this study provide contributions to both theory and the existing 
body of research. From a theoretical standpoint, this investigation served as the 
first quantitative study to consider the role of status and reputation in de-escalation 
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of commitment. Within our context—and among the population of universities 
having discontinued a Division I football program—the findings indicated that 
universities can expect little positive or negative impact to academic status and 
reputation, and a slight negative impact to athletic status.10 The primary theoretical 
contribution from this study related to the potential for changing the perception of 
how de-escalation of commitment is viewed by stakeholders. For instance, within 
the context of intercollegiate athletics, prior research investigating the process of 
de-escalation revealed how stakeholders viewed reducing commitment to Division I 
athletics as not only undesirable, but likely to produce negative consequences to the 
university and athletic department (see Hutchinson & Bouchet, 2014b). However, at 
certain universities, our findings revealed de-escalation of commitment—manifest 
in football program discontinuation—as unlikely to produce substantial positive or 
negative consequences. Thus, while organizational stakeholders may view de-esca-
lation behavior as unfavorable, theoretically, the tangible impact on the university 
and athletic department should not necessarily be perceived as negative in nature.
This contribution has the potential to be a valuable addition to Montealegre 
and Keil’s (2000) process model of de-escalation. In their model, organizations 
progress through four phases in the de-escalation process: problem recognition, 
reexamination of the prior course of action, searching for an alternative course of 
action, and implementing an exit strategy. Within the implementing an exit strat-
egy phase, two primary triggering activities11 involve appealing to stakeholders 
and de-institutionalizing the course of action. As investigated by Hutchinson and 
Bouchet (2014a), this final phase is especially challenging for decision makers due 
in part to the uncertainty associated with the decision to de-escalate and its impact 
on the university and athletic department. Our findings provide useful information 
in appealing to stakeholders and de-institutionalizing the course of action in that 
decision makers can use these findings as a basis for reducing negative perceptions 
associated with de-escalation, thus easing concerns among some—certainly not 
all—stakeholders.
The findings from this study also further our understanding of research related 
to reducing commitment to intercollegiate athletics. The current study extends 
the research of Goff (2000) and Jones (2014) by examining more variables and 
investigating the entire population of universities having discontinued a Division 
I football program. These findings provide a comprehensive overview of all uni-
versities having discontinued their Division I football program and the subsequent 
impact on the status and reputation of both the university and athletic department. 
Certainly, adding to the existing literature would have been enhanced had there 
been sufficient data to examine other variables representing status and reputation. 
Regardless, these findings provide valuable information and potential future direc-
tion for investigating commitment reduction at other levels of competition (e.g., 
NCAA Division II, NCAA Division III).
Implications
Beyond these contributions, the findings also provide universities with practical 
information for making a more informed decision regarding commitment to a 
Division I football program. As noted on several occasions above, the implica-
tions should be considered in light of the population of universities discontinuing 
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a Division I football program—that of mostly Division I FCS and select Division 
I FBS (non-Power 5) competing members. Further, the implications also depend 
on the individual university, and should be considered in light of (a) the financial 
and economic gain or loss of the football program and (b) the extent of university 
reliance in using the football program for marketing purposes. Consequently, the 
findings provide two principle implications for universities to consider.
First, for select universities, the loss of marketing aspects of football may 
counteract whatever gain exists. Research has revealed how competition in Divi-
sion I—notably sponsoring a Division I football program—can generate widespread 
university exposure through media coverage of athletics (Clotfelter, 2011) and also 
positively impact the public perception of a university’s academic quality (Goidel 
& Hamilton, 2006; Roy, Graeff, & Harmon, 2008). Assuming football program 
profitability, this would not even be a reallocation of money. For example, Rascher 
and Schwarz (2015) point out that UAB football was actually providing a gain in 
net income for the university rather than a loss. At UAB, this was due to athletic 
scholarships costing far less than their listed prices, the financial value of FBS 
conference membership compared with an alternative non-FBS conference, and 
the revenue from the College Football Playoff outpacing new expense categories 
like unlimited food and cost of attendance stipends. Consequently, from a market-
ing perspective, part of the “front porch” of the university is gone and there is no 
concomitant improvement in academics or in the rest of athletics. In application, 
this may be particularly beneficial for select universities—notably those competing 
in the FBS—that experience a financial or economic gain from the football program 
and rely heavily on it for university marketing purposes.
Second, and conversely, the results of this study may also be a motivating factor 
for discontinuing a Division I football program. For instance, universities with a 
football program that is producing a net loss and does not serve to substantially 
market the university may view these findings as the impetus for discontinuation 
with little to no negative consequences. Examples of such universities are those 
likely competing as lower performing FBS members and most FCS members. 
However, the analysis presented here does not include the possible negative impact 
of de-escalation on donations to the university (Stinson & Howard, 2007), diversity 
of the student body (Pope & Pope, 2007), and retention and graduation rates of 
nonathlete students (Mixon & Trevino, 2005). Yet, in application, discontinuing 
football may be beneficial for select universities investing valuable and often 
scarce financial resources in a Division I program that produces limited revenue 
and minimal marketing benefits from program sponsorship.
Conclusion
This study sought to examine the impact of de-escalating Division I commitment—
specifically discontinuing a Division I football program—on the status and reputa-
tion of the university and athletic department. The results inform select universities 
that discontinuing a Division I football program will have little positive or negative 
impact on academic status and reputation, and a slight negative impact on athletic 
status. The primary limitation of this study was data availability. While several 
measures of both status and reputation were collected, much of the data originally 
planned for analysis simply did not exist. Consequently, a more comprehensive 
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assessment of status and reputation was not attainable. A secondary limitation is 
related to generalizability given the population of universities having discontinued a 
Division I football program. In addition to a large majority of the population having 
competed in the FCS, the few FBS universities discontinuing a football program 
were non-Power 5 members doing so in excess of 20 years in the past (excluding 
University of the Pacific). Consequently, generalizing these findings to many FBS 
competing universities is likely not appropriate.
Future research should consider several areas of inquiry. First, from a broad 
de-escalation of commitment perspective, other sport and nonsport settings should 
be examined to realize the impact of reducing commitment to a failing course of 
action. Second, within the context of intercollegiate athletics, universities in other 
NCAA divisions or athletic associations having de-escalated commitment (e.g., 
discontinuing a football program, reclassifying to a lower division or alternate 
athletic association, discontinuing the athletic department altogether) should be 
examined for determining if similar findings exist. Finally, researchers should 
investigate universities that have increased their commitment to athletics (e.g., 
reclassifying from Division II to Division I, transitioning from the FCS to FBS) 
to determine any impact on the status and reputation of the university and athletic 
department. Given the changing landscape of Division I athletics, determining the 
most beneficial commitment to athletic programs is an important issue in sport 
and university policy. Most notably, this research adds important information on 
assessing previous decisions to discontinue a Division I football program and what 
became of those decisions.
Notes
1.  The Power 5 conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten Confer-
ence (Big 10), Big 12 Conference (Big 12), Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), and Southeastern 
Conference (SEC).
2.  UAB is scheduled to reinstate football in 2017.
3. In 1981, the NCAA announced the adoption of a college football television plan that would 
reduce the negative effect of live television on game attendance by (a) limiting the amount of 
televised college football games, (b) the number of games that any one university may televise, 
and (c) not allowing for the sale of individual university television rights (except in accordance 
with the plan). Threatened with disciplinary action should they pursue television agreements 
inconsistent with the new television plan, College Football Association (CFA) universities filed 
a federal lawsuit claiming that the NCAA was violating the Sherman Antitrust Act by restrain-
ing competition in the relevant market of “live college football television.” Following a series of 
appeals, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA’s television plan was in violation 
of the Sherman Act and thus disallowed from implementation. This ruling provided CFA universi-
ties and athletic conferences the option of pursuing television agreements that produced a higher 
ceiling of revenue generation.
4.  While most escalation circumstances involve outcomes related to financial return or economic 
impact, Staw (1981) originally identified additional outcomes that extend beyond financial or 
economic pursuits (for examples, see p. 577–578).
5.  Similar to the current study, the universities sampled in Hutchinson (2013) self-identified 
their escalation of commitment. Thus, determining escalation—and subsequent de-escalation—was 
not a matter for researcher discretion. Determining escalation of commitment among universities 
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that remain committed to Division I (notably a FBS or FCS football program) is far more chal-
lenging, as there are a variety of tangible (e.g., finance and economics) and intangible (e.g., sense 
of community) factors for consideration (see Frieder & Fulks, 2007; Rascher & Schwarz, 2015).
6.  This data are from the actual academic year (e.g., the 2014–2015 edition was based on Fall 
2013 data; thus, the 2014–2015 edition ranking is associated with 2013–2014 academic year 
data).
7.  Universities reclassifying to a lower NCAA division or alternate athletic association and 
universities discontinuing their Division I athletic department altogether did not provide a suf-
ficient number of universities for observation, as well as inconsistent and insufficient data. For 
example, from 1981 to present day, only four universities reclassified to a lower division or 
alternate classification—all of which reclassified to NCAA Division III. Two of these four did so 
in the mid-1980s and early 1990s; thus, data were limited. Similarly, from 1981 to present day, 
only three universities discontinued their Division I athletic department altogether. Only two of 
the three were seriously considered due to contextual considerations (i.e., Morris Brown College 
lost its NCAA accreditation due to substantial university financial circumstances) and data were 
greatly limited for those two given the timing of the decision (early and mid-1990s).
8.  Creating an average of the five years prior and after the decision to deescalate and then 
conducting a differences in means test is a more stringent test than simply analyzing a differences 
in means treating each year as if it were an independently generated event (that would be about 
100 observations instead of about 20, depending on which outcome variable is being analyzed). 
This is akin to a “between effects” regression for a panel data set that takes the average of each 
group within the panel and then analyzes it statistically. It is a more stringent test because having 
a similar number appear five times repeatedly in the sample is essentially creating five false 
observations out of what is really one observation (e.g., a school’s typical incoming SAT score 
for a number of years).
9.  These figures were obtained from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883611.html
10.  These findings should be applied in light of individual university circumstances. For instance, 
a large majority of universities discontinuing a Division I football program competed within the 
Division I FCS. Accordingly, one should consider that there likely exists a substantial difference 
in the impact of discontinuing a football program on a university competing in a Division I FBS 
Power 5 conference and a university in a Division I FBS non-Power 5 conference. A similar 
comparison can be likened to a university in a Division I FBS non-Power 5 conference and a 
university in a Division I FCS conference.
11.  Within the process model of de-escalation, Montealegre and Keil (2000) identified several 
triggering activities within each of the four phases that facilitate progression and completion of 
de-escalating commitment.
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Erratum, Hutchinson, Rascher, and Jennings (2016)
The authors failed to cite Bouchet, Laird, Troilo, Hutchinson, and Ferris (in press) 
in the original manuscript. Appropriate citations of Bouchet et al. (in press) are now 
included in this corrected article. The online version has been corrected.
